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THE ONGOING STRUGGLE TO DETERMINE FEDERAL
"ARISING UNDER" JURISDICTION IN COPYRIGHT: THE
COMPLETE PREEMPTION EXCEPTION TO THE
WELL PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
INTRODUCTION
Copyright is one of the oldest institutionally protected rights in the
United States. The notion of federally protected copyright originated in
the United States Constitution in 1787.1 One of the powers the Constitu-
tion grants to Congress is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ' '  What is
omitted from these instructions is how the government should promote
progress and protect rights. To what extent must the government protect
these rights? How can citizens raise grievances that their rights have
been infringed upon? Who should hear and adjudicate these grievances?
Although copyright was not a prominent issue in the early years of
the republic, advances in technology have greatly increased the number
and variety of actual and potential copyright cases. Cases involving
copyright issues present one persistent jurisdictional question: what
makes a copyright case a federal case? Copyright owners regularly li-
cense or assign their rights in contractual agreements and the breach of
such an agreement may give rise to a breach of contract claim, a claim
for copyright infringement, or both. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright cases.3  Yet
determining when a case is a "copyright" case is not always straightfor-
ward.
Infringement of copyright is a violation of the federal Copyright Act
and therefore a federal claim. 4 However, breach of contract is a state law
cause of action and therefore undeserving of federal jurisdiction.5 In
response to claims brought under state law, the defendant may assert
counterclaims or defenses based in federal copyright law. In this con-
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
2. Id.
3. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (West 2007) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent,
plant variety protection and copyright cases.").
4. 17 U.S.C.A. § 501(a) (West 2007).
5. See generally Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 285 (6th Cir. 2005) (delineating between
state and federal causes of action in a copyright case).
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text, a court must determine whether the case properly belongs in state or
federal court.
In 1964, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
established a test for determining whether a copyright claim deserves
federal jurisdiction. In TB. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,6 the court attempted to
formulate a rule to resolve "whether and how a complaint implicates the
Copyright Act.",7 The three-part TB. Harms test was praised by leading
copyright scholars8 but also suffered from a variety of misinterpretations
and was subsequently applied by various courts in a contradictory man-
ner.9 Only in 2000 did the Second Circuit emerge from this confusion to
clarify the TB. Harms test and promulgate the well pleaded complaint
rule as the standard for determining federal copyright jurisdiction.10 In
2002 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the primacy of the well
pleaded complaint rule for determining whether cases gamer federal ju-
risdiction under § 1338(a)."
'While it might appear that all federal courts should fall into line
with the Supreme Court, some circuits have not adopted the rule. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit did not address the
question of what test to apply to determine jurisdiction in a copyright suit
until Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co. 12 in 2006. Ab-
sent a Supreme Court opinion on the use of the well pleaded complaint
rule in the copyright context, there continues to be noteworthy scholarly
discourse questioning the wisdom of the rule.
Although the well pleaded complaint rule has distinct weaknesses, it
remains the best standard for determining federal jurisdiction in copy-
right cases. The developing complete preemption doctrine-when ap-
plied in the copyright contexts-ameliorates one of the well pleaded
complaint rule's significant weaknesses. Complete preemption applies
when the force of a federal statute is so extraordinary that it converts a
state law complaint into a federal claim.' 3  State law claims that are
equivalent to copyright infringement claims can be completely pre-
empted by the Copyright Act and removed to federal court even if they
do not state a federal claim.'
4
6. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
7. Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 348 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2nd Cir. 1964)).
8. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 349 (citing 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
12.01[A]).
9. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 351 n.4.
10. Id. at 355.
11. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002).
12. 459 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2006).
13. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987)).
14. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 286-87.
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Applying the complete preemption doctrine as an exception to the
well pleaded complaint rule provides a practical solution to some of the
well pleaded complaint rule's shortcomings. It addresses concerns about
these shortcomings while still achieving the desired consistency and uni-
formity that the well pleaded complaint rule provides.
Part I of this article describes the case law addressing whether a
case "arises under" the Copyright Act and therefore enjoys federal juris-
diction. This part focuses on significant copyright decisions handed
down by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Part II describes Image
Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co.' 5 and the Tenth Circuit's
adoption of the Second Circuit's well pleaded complaint rule in copy-
right cases. Part III identifies the Supreme Court's guidance in establish-
ing the well pleaded complaint rule and the frequent intersection of con-
tract and copyright claims.
Part IV analyzes the underpinnings of the well pleaded complaint
rule and identifies arguments supporting the rule and promoting uniform-
ity among the federal courts in determining copyright jurisdiction. Part
IV goes on to note the shortcomings of competing standards and address
arguments against the rule. In an effort to tackle a significant weakness
of the well pleaded complaint rule, this article suggests applying the
complete preemption doctrine as an exception to the well pleaded com-
plaint rule.
I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S REIGN IN "ARISING UNDER" COPYRIGHT
JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Groundwork
Article I of the Constitution provides Congress the power to secure
to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their works. 16 Under Ar-
ticle III, the federal judiciary is given the power to adjudicate all cases
arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States., 7 Con-
gress established copyrights in the early years of the republic and,
through the Copyright Act of 1976,18 gave the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over copyright claims.' 9
Congress established federal jurisdiction over copyright claims in
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a): "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents,
plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction
shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety pro-
15. 459 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2006).
16. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
17. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1.
18. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-810 (West 2007).
19. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a).
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tection and copyright cases. 2 ° Courts have wrestled with the meaning of
"arising under" in the copyright framework since the enactment of §
1338(a). 21 There has been an ongoing struggle to define exactly when a
claim "arises under" the Copyright Act and therefore garners federal
jurisdiction.22 A suit that simply mentions or involves copyright does not
necessarily "arise under" the Copyright Act and therefore does not nec-
essarily come before a federal court. 3
Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider the
definition of "arising under" in the realm of copyright, 4 it has decided
cases addressing § 1338(a)'s "arising under" language.25 American Well
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.26 involved a patent claim that began in
state court, was removed to federal district court, and appealed to the
27Supreme Court. Justice Holmes explained that "[a] suit arises under
the law that creates the cause of action., 28 The plaintiff in American
Well Works did not seek relief under federal patent law and the Court
therefore ruled that it belonged in state court.29 Justice Holmes' concise
statement laid a foundation for approaches to "arising under" jurisdiction
in copyright as well as patent cases.30
B. T.B. Harms Company v. Eliscu
Almost fifty years after Justice Holmes discussed the "arising un-
der" language in § 1338(a), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the issue in TB. Harms Co. v. Eliscu.31 The court's decision
subsequently suffered a variety of interpretations and ignited a polarized
scholarly debate that continues to smolder.
The T.B. Harms Company brought an action for declaratory judg-
ment and equitable relief in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, claiming that under a contract with Eliscu, Harms owned
renewal copyrights in songs Eliscu co-authored.32 The plaintiff asserted
20. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (West 2007).
21. Christopher D. Birrer, A Jurisdictional "Nightmare ": Determining When an Interdepend-
ent Copyright and Contract Claim "Arises Under" the Copyright Act in Scholastic Entertainment,
Inc. v. Fox Entertainment Group, Inc., 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 276 (2004).
22. James M. McCarthy, Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction: When Does a Case Involving
the Breach of a Copyright Licensing Contract "Arise Under" the Copyright Act?, 19 DAYTON L.
REv. 165, 169 (1993).
23. Id.
24. Amy B. Cohen, "Arising Under" Jurisdiction and the Copyright Laws, 44 HASTINGS L.J.
337, 351 (1993).
25. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916); Holmes
Group, Inc., 535 U.S. at 829-30.
26. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
27. Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 258.
28. Id. at 260.
29. Id.
30. Daniel E. Wanat, Copyright and Contracts: The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts Under 28 U.S.C. 1338(a), 11 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 361, 366 (2001).
31. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964).
32. TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 824-25.
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federal jurisdiction subject to § 1338(a) and the defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
and lack of federal jurisdiction. 33 The district court judge dismissed the
complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction and Harms appealed.34
Writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Friendly
acknowledged the utility of Justice Holmes' American Well Works test in
explaining federal jurisdiction in "a great many cases, notably copyright
and patent infringement actions." 35  Yet, noting that Holmes' formula
was "more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was
intended," Friendly found that "Harms' claim [wa]s not within Holmes'
definition."
36
Facing a need for clarification and mindful of how difficult it was to
formulate, the Second Circuit arrived at a three-part test for establishing
when an action "arises under" the Copyright Act.37 Federal jurisdiction
shall be conferred
if and only if the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the
Act... or asserts a claim requiring construction of the Act... or, at
the very least and more doubtfully, presents a case where a distinc-
tive policy of the Act requires that federal principles control the dis-
position of the claim.
38
Judge Friendly noted that federal jurisdiction is held to exist when a
claim is brought for copyright infringement but also observed that "the
jurisdictional statute does not speak in terms of infringement, and the
undoubted truth that a claim for infringement 'arises under' the Copy-
right Act does not establish that nothing else can. 3 9 Friendly went on to
examine the ways in which federal jurisdiction might be appropriate for
Harms' claims, including if the complaint showed a need for determining
the meaning or application of a federal law. 40 Federal jurisdiction could
even be found where the issue might seem to be one of local law as long
as the federal interest was dominant.41 T.B. Harms became the leading
case on how and whether a claim "arises under" the Copyright Act.42
33. Id. at 825.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 826.
36. Id. at 827.
37. Id. at 828.
38. Id..
39. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825.
40. Id. at 827.
41. Id. at 827-28.
42. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 169.
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C. The T.B. Harms Fallout
Many courts relied on the TB. Harms test to determine federal
copyright jurisdiction,43 but the application was inconsistent."a Interpre-
tations of the opinion ultimately crystallized into two general jurisdic-
tional tests: the "well pleaded complaint" rule
45 and the "essence test. 'A46
The well pleaded complaint approach determines jurisdiction solely
on the pleadings submitted by the plaintiff and views the surrounding
circumstances of the suit as irrelevant to the choice of jurisdiction.47 The
well pleaded complaint standard follows from the first facet of the TB.
Harms test, which allows federal jurisdiction "if the complaint is for a
remedy expressly granted by the Act.",48 There is also support for this
standard in the Second Circuit's determination that federal jurisdiction
exists when the plaintiffs pleading is directed toward infringement and
not the license itself.
49
In contrast, the essence test attempts to distill the "essence" of the
claim as a basis for jurisdictional determination. 50 Under this standard,
courts should establish the "essence" of the plaintiff's claim and only
grant federal jurisdiction to matters of legitimate federal significance. 51
Development of the essence test can also be traced to language in the
T.B. Harms case. First, the TB. Harms district court explained that the
formal allegations must yield to the substance of the claim.52 The "mere
circumstance" that the suit "incidentally" centered on copyright did not,
on its own, justify federal jurisdiction.5 3  Second, Judge Friendly in-
structed that provisions conferring federal jurisdiction should be read
narrowly to avoid depriving state courts of jurisdiction over cases that
have little federal significance. 54 Under the essence test, courts should
look beyond the face of the complaint to determine the "essence" of the
claim and only allow federal jurisdiction where the thrust of the case
"arises under" the Copyright Act.
43. Cohen, supra note 24, at 362.
44. Id.
45. Birrer, supra note 21, at 286.
46. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 179.
47. Cohen, supra note 24, at 371-72. This standard is also applied to other areas of federal
jurisdiction to determine whether a complaint "arises under" federal law.
48. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 175 (citing T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2nd
Cir. 1964)).




53. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 226 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
54. Birrer, supra note 21, at 283.
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D. Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers
After twenty-eight years of conflicting decisions,55 in 1992 the Sec-
ond Circuit adopted the essence test in Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publish-
ers.56 Harris Schoenberg, an author, brought a federal suit against his
publisher for breach of their publication agreement and infringement on
his copyrighted work.57 The defendants' former attorney appealed his
conviction for contempt and questioned the jurisdiction of the federal
district court.
58
Referring to select previous Second Circuit decisions, 59 the Schoen-
berg court determined that a district court may "refer to evidence outside
of the pleadings" to decide subject matter jurisdiction.60 This conflicted
with American Well Works61 as well as an earlier Justice Holmes deci-
sion which explained that "the party who brings a suit is master to decide
what law he will rely upon, and therefore does determine whether he will
bring a 'suit arising under' the ... law of the United States by his decla-
ration or bill."62
Schoenberg advocated a three-part essence test to "clarify the
proper approach" for determining whether a suit "arises under" the
Copyright Act and therefore deserves federal jurisdiction.63 First, the
court must ascertain whether an infringement claim is only "incidental"
to a determination of ownership or rights under a copyright.64  If the
claim is not merely incidental, the court must examine whether the com-
plaint alleges a breach of the contract licensing or assigning the copy-
right.65 If such a breach is alleged, there is federal jurisdiction, but if the
complaint merely alleges a breach of contract then the court must en-
deavor to take a third step.66 If the breach was so material as to create a
right of rescission in the grantor, then the claim arises under the Copy-
right Act.67
The Schoenberg court acknowledged that the last two steps would
often determine the "essence" of the claim and that, "in practice," the
55. Wanat, supra note 30, at 385-86.
56. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992).
57. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 928.
58. Id. at 930.
59. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 932 (citing T.B. Harms, 226 F. Supp. at 337; Costello Pub. Co. v.
Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Berger v. Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
60. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 933.
61. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
62. Edwin E. Richards, Drafting Licenses to Guide Whether Potential Disputes Lie in Con-
tract or Infringement, 7 COMP. L. REV. & TECH J. 45, 50 (2002) (citing Fair v. Kohler Die & Spe-
cialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)).
63. Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 932.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 932-33.
67. Id. at 933.
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three steps would merge into one 8.6  Despite the Second Circuit's effort
to clarify the law, the Schoenberg essence test was met with criticism
69
and was eventually invalidated.70
E. Basset v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
In Basset v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe71 the Second Circuit re-
sponded to criticisms and rejected the essence test that it established in
the Schoenberg decision.72 Debra Basset contracted to produce a film for
the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe in an agreement that granted Basset ex-
clusive rights to the film.73 After Basset wrote and delivered a script, the
tribe told Basset that it was terminating the agreement.74 The tribe con-
tinued to pursue production of the film and Basset brought suit seeking
an injunction and other copyright remedies.75
The Basset court reviewed the T.B. Harms opinion,76 addressed
criticisms of that decision, 77 and then questioned the wisdom of Schoen-
berg.78 The court identified a number of shortcomings in finding the
essence test "unworkable."-79 First, the court noted the perverse possibil-
ity that, under Schoenberg, only those cases with a strong defense would
warrant federal jurisdiction.8 0  A court could deny a plaintiff a federal
forum and, therefore, the benefit of copyright remedies because her
copyright claims were incidental to her contract dispute.81 "A plaintiff
with meritorious copyright claims and entitlement to the special remedies
provided by the Act [could be] deprived of these remedies merely be-
cause the first hurdle of proving entitlement is a showing of a contractual
right. "1
82
The Basset court identified a second Schoenberg shortcoming: the
essence test is "based more on the defense than on the demands asserted
in the complaint. 83 A plaintiff might not be able to establish whether to
file her complaint in federal or state court because the jurisdictional de-
termination would be based on the defendant's response.84 Furthermore,
a court might not know the "essence" of the plaintiffs claim simply
68. Id.
69. Birrer, supra note 21, at 292-93.
70. Id. at 288.
71. 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000).
72. Birrer, supra note 21, at 288.
73. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 346.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 348-51.
77. Id. at 351 n.4.
78. Id. at 352-55.
79. Id. at 352.
80. Richards, supra note 62, at 49.
81. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 352.
82. Id. at 352-53.
83. Id. at 353.
84. Id.
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based on the complaint.8 5 The Basset court felt that this inability to pre-
dict jurisdiction under the essence test was a "major problem."
8 6
A final shortcoming of the essence test is that it "requires the court
to make complex factual determinations relating to the merits at the out-
set of the litigation-before the court has any familiarity with the case."
87
Such determinations could "require extensive hearings and fact finding"
and could recur "at each stage of Schoenberg's three-step formula." 8
The Basset court expressed concern that jurisdiction would be decided by
determining the "essence" of the claim even though the "essence" could
not be determined solely on the pleadings.89
After rejecting the essence test, the court went on to establish the
well pleaded complaint rule for determining jurisdiction in copyright
cases. 90 The court harkened back to Justice Holmes' American Well
Works decision in maintaining that "a suit arises under the law that cre-
ates the cause of action"91 and that jurisdiction should be based upon the
content of the plaintiff's complaint. 92 This established the well pleaded
complaint rule as the standard for determining federal "arising under"
jurisdiction in copyright. The court determined that because Basset's
complaint alleged a violation of the Copyright Act and sought injunctive
relief provided by the Act, the action deserved federal jurisdiction.93
II. 1MAGE SOFTWARE, INC. V. REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS Co.
While a number of federal circuits have adopted the well pleaded
complaint rule in copyright, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit only recently enunciated its stance on federal "arising un-
der' jurisdiction for copyright claims. In image Software, Inc. v. Rey-
nolds & Reynolds Co.,94 the court took the opportunity to adopt the well
pleaded complaint rule for determining whether a copyright case arises
under the laws of the United States.
A. Facts
Plaintiff Image Software Inc. ("Image") developed imaging soft-
ware to capture and archive business reports, alleviating the need for
handling paper documents. 95 Defendant Reynolds and Reynolds Com-
85. Id. at 353-54.
86. Id. at 354 n. 1I (citing Cohen, supra note 24, at 374).
87. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 354.
88. Id.
89. Wanat, supra note 30, at 390.
90. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 352-55.
91. Id. at 355 (citing Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916)).
92. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355 (citing Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914)).
93. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355-56.
94. 459 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2006).
95. Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1169 (D. Colo.
2003).
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pany ("Reynolds") aimed to market Image's product to car dealerships
and entered into a licensing agreement with image96 to this end.97 Pur-
suant to a 1994 agreement, Image sold Reynolds perpetual and non-
exclusive licenses to the software for a one-time fee.98 Image granted
Reynolds the right to use, market, and distribute the software9 9 and
agreed to make subsequent upgrades available to Reynolds for an ar-
ranged fee.100
In 1996, Image and Reynolds entered into a subsequent agreement,
providing Reynolds with an updated version of the software, Release
5.5.10 The 1996 agreement also allowed either party to terminate the
license upon ninety days notice. 10 2 Reynolds terminated the agreement
in 2002, and Image informed Reynolds that Reynolds could no longer
use the licensed software. 10 3 Reynolds, however, continued to use and
distribute Release 5.5. Image brought suit, charging that Reynolds' use
infringed on Image's copyright.1 4
Pursuant to an arbitration clause in the 1994 agreement, Reynolds
filed a motion to stay federal litigation and compel arbitration. 0 5 The
district court granted the arbitration motion, an arbitrator granted Rey-
nolds almost $400,000 in damages, and the district court confirmed the
arbitrator's order.'0 6 Image subsequently appealed, challenging the dis-
trict court's order and jurisdiction.
0 7
B. Decision
In addressing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals noted that although the parties in the case never
questioned the federal courts' jurisdiction, the district court rightfully
raised the issue sua sponte. 10 8 The district court invoked federal jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331109 and 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)" and deter-
mined that the complaint pled a federal copyright claim."' The district
96. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1169. The agreement was executed by ISI, parent company of
Image. Id.
97. Image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
98. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
99. Image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
100. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1169-70.
101. Image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 1170.
105. Image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
106. Id. at 1047-48.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2007) ("[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
110. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a). ("[D]istrict courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trademarks.")
111. Image, 273 F. Supp. 2dat l171.
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court applied the well pleaded complaint rule and found that it had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction because image had requested relief under the
federal Copyright Act. 12 The district court relied on Basset v. Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribe, 13 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed, taking the "oppor-
tunity to adopt the Second Circuit's analytical approach." ' 14 The Tenth
Circuit's decision quotes liberally from Basset in embracing the well
pleaded complaint rule as "'[t]he most frequently cited test' for determin-
ing whether an action arises under the Copyright Act."'1 15
In adopting the Second Circuit test, the court engaged in a retelling
of the history of Basset, including a recitation of the problems with the
essence test. 16 The court also recounted a more recent Ninth Circuit
decision that similarly adopted the well pleaded complaint rule. 17 Ap-
plying the Second Circuit's well pleaded complaint rule to the Image
case, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the lower court decision and affirmed
that the federal courts had subject matter jurisdiction over Image's copy-
right claim." 
8
III. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE UNDERPINNINGS OF THE WELL
PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE
There is a history of Supreme Court support for applying the well
pleaded complaint rule to determine jurisdiction for cases "arising under"
federal laws such as § 1338(a)." 9 The Court recently reaffirmed that the
well pleaded complaint rule should be applied to cases questioning pat-
ents in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.'
20
This rule should also apply to copyright because patent and copyright are
treated similarly under § 1338(a).' 2' In addition, acts of Congress sug-
gest that the well pleaded complaint rule should determine jurisdictional
questions in copyright cases.
A. Supreme Court Support
The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed the primacy of
the well pleaded complaint rule and established a solid statutory founda-
tion for its application. 22 Although Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
112. Id.
113. 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000).
114. Image, 459 F.3d at 1049.
115. Id. (quoting Gener-Villar v. Adcom Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 2005)).
116. Image, 459 F.3d at 1050.
117. Id. at 1050 n.7 (citing Scholastic Entr't, Inc. v. Fox Entm't Group, Inc., 336 F.3d 982,
985-86 (9th Cir. 2003)).
118. lmage, 459F.3dat 1051.
119. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 258, 260 (1916).
120. 535 U.S. 826, 830 (2002).
121. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (West 2007) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdic-
tion of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection,
copyrights and trademarks."). In construing "arising under" jurisdiction for § 1338(a), the Holmes
Group decision applies to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, and trademarks. Id.
122. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 830.
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Circulation Systems, Inc., addressed a patent law claim, 23 the ruling ap-
plies to copyright because both areas of law are addressed in §
1338(a). 124 In Holmes Group, the Court noted that the strength of §
1338(a) draws from its "linguistic consistency" with § 1331,125 which
confers federal jurisdiction on "all civil actions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws or treaties of the United States."'
126
The Court in Holmes Group stated that "the well-pleaded-complaint
rule has long governed whether a case 'arises under' federal law for pur-
poses of § 1331.' 27 The "arising under" language is the same in § 1331
and § 1338(a) so the well pleaded complaint rule should determine juris-
diction in § 1338(a) cases as well. The Court bolstered its support of the
well pleaded complaint rule by noting that to allow a counterclaim to
establish "arising under" jurisdiction would "contravene the longstanding
policies underlying our precedents."'' 28 Although the Tenth Circuit did
not cite Holmes Group in its Image decision, deliberate adoption of the
well pleaded complaint rule brings the Tenth Circuit into line with the
high court's prevailing decision.
As the Holmes Group court explained, the "linguistic consistency"
of §§ 1331 and 1338(a) provides statutory support for the well pleaded
complaint rule.129 It establishes uniformity between "arising under" ju-
risdiction for copyright claims under § 1338(a) and general "arising un-
der" jurisdiction for all cases of original federal jurisdiction under §
1331. This, in turn, maintains the primacy of the well pleaded complaint
rule by requiring that all cases garnering federal jurisdiction "arise un-
der" federal law.
B. The Statutory Outlook
Is § 1338(a) necessary if it grants jurisdiction identical to § 1331?
Section 1331 grants original federal jurisdiction to any case arising under
the laws of the United States. 130  Section 1338(a)-granting the same
jurisdiction but referring to patents, plant variety, copyrights and trade-
marks-seems redundant. The reason for these different provisions is
not clear. One may conclude that the use of the well pleaded complaint
rule for cases "arising under" § 1331 implies the use of the rule for cases
123. Id.
124. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a).
125. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 829-30 (citing Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.
486 U.S. 800, 808 (1988)).
126. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.
127. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 830 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S.
125, 127-28 (1974) (per curiam)).
128. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 831.
129. Id. at 829-30.
130. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.
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"arising under" § 1338(a). 3 ' The broad use of the well pleaded com-
plaint rule for all federal questions under § 1331 supports the consistent
use of the rule for questions involving copyright.
The Copyright Act of 1976 established exclusive federal jurisdic-
tion for all copyright claims and made copyright law federal law.'
32
Since § 1331 grants original federal jurisdiction to all claims arising un-
der federal law and all copyright claims arise under federal law, the use
of the well pleaded complaint rule for § 1331 questions implies its use
for copyright questions. This statutory consistency provides further sup-
port for the use of the well pleaded complaint rule in determining copy-
right jurisdiction.
C. Copyright and Contract
The frequent relationship between copyright and contract is inextri-
cably related to the discussion of "arising under" jurisdiction and the
well pleaded complaint rule. Copyright owners regularly use contracts to
license or assign their rights. 133 Disputes relating to these contracts arise
and some of these disputes result in lawsuits. If one of the parties seeks
federal jurisdiction, the court must use the well pleaded complaint rule to
determine whether the suit "arises under" the Copyright Act.
34
There is an inherent tension between state and federal law in copy-
right claims because the breach of a license or assignment of a copyright
may raise a contract claim (state law), a claim of infringement (federal
law), or both. Courts must focus on the plaintiffs allegations to deter-
mine whether the dispute is primarily a federal concern, outweighing the
issues of state contract law.
35
In general, courts have held that a suit by a copyright holder for
royalties under a license or agreement does not arise under the copyright
laws of the United States and does not deserve federal jurisdiction. 136 In
TB. Harms, Judge Friendly suggested a situation where the plaintiff li-
censed his copyright and the defendant forfeited the grant. 1
37
[I]n such cases federal jurisdiction is held to exist if the plaintiff has
directed his pleading against the offending use, referring to the li-
cense only by way of anticipatory replication, but not if he has sued
131. John Donofrio & Edward C. Donovan, Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.:
The Application of Federal Precedent to Federal Circuit Jurisdiction Decisions, 45 AM. U. L. REV.
1835, 1837-38 (1996).
132. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (a) (West 2007).
133. See 17 U.S.C.A § 201(d); McCarthy, supra note 22, at 165 n.2.
134. Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1051 (10th Cir. 2006).
135. Cohen, supra note 24, at 392-94.
136. See Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 502 (1926) (stating a general rule for patent
which concurrently applies to copyright).
137. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 825 (2d Cir. 1964).
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to set the license aside, seeking recovery for unauthorized use only
incidentally or not at all.13
8
Friendly explained that, in order to gamer federal jurisdiction, a
copyright claim must allege infringement and offending use and not
breach of the contract that originally permitted the use.
139
The scenario Judge Friendly envisioned matches the circumstances
of Image. Image and Reynolds had an agreement licensing Image's
software, Reynolds terminated the agreement, and Image brought suit
alleging infringement.140  These circumstances demonstrate the impor-
tance of following the well pleaded complaint rule. A plaintiff alleging
copyright infringement, not breach of the licensing agreement or assign-
ment, deserves federal jurisdiction. A complaint that raises state claims
belongs in state court.
IV. THE WELL PLEADED COMPLAINT RULE AND THE FUTURE OF
COPYRIGHT JURISDICTION
In spite of some weaknesses-discussed below-the well pleaded
complaint rule remains the majority rule for determining jurisdiction for
copyright claims. The well pleaded complaint rule maintains the long-
held principle that the plaintiff is master of his complaint, it encourages
uniformity in determining the venue for copyright claims, and it is the
better choice when viewed in light of the shortcomings of the essence
test. However, use of the well pleaded complaint rule may fail to result
in federal jurisdiction for state contract claims that implicate significant
copyright issues and therefore belong in federal court. This article pro-
poses an exception to the rule to ameliorate this problem.
A. Importance of the Well Pleaded Complaint Rule
1. Plaintiff as Master of His Complaint
It is well established that the plaintiff is the master of his com-
plaint.' 4' As such, the plaintiff has complete discretion in choosing
where to bring his case. A plaintiff praying for state court adjudication is
given deference in electing to bring a state, not federal, claim.142 The
essence test allows a defendant to frustrate the plaintiffs choice of a state
forum by raising a federal issue in a counterclaim.143 A defendant should
not be allowed to defeat a plaintiff's choice of a state court forum simply
138. TB. Harms, 339 F.2d at 825.
139. See id.
140. image, 459 F.3d at 1047.
141. Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913); Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vor-
nado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (citing Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
142. Cohen, supra note 24, at 382-83.
143. Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 349 (2d. Cir. 2000).
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by including a federal counterclaim.144 The well pleaded complaint rule
rightly places the plaintiff in charge of his suit by allowing him to choose
the jurisdiction in which he will be heard.
The creativity of a defendant's response should not be allowed to al-
ter a plaintiffs choice of venue. To permit the defendant to deliberately
frustrate the plaintiffs prerogative undermines the balance of power in
the adversary system. The well pleaded complaint rule maintains a
plaintiffs right to determine the whether a state or federal court will re-
solve the dispute.
2. Uniformity
Another advantage of the well pleaded complaint rule is that it pro-
vides uniformity for the courts and the parties. There are a host of rea-
sons why uniformity is desirable and this article will highlight four such
reasons: doctrinal stability, equal treatment across the federal system,
the desirability of appearing before judges with expertise in particular
areas of law, and discouraging forum shopping and gamesmanship.
The well pleaded complaint rule promotes uniformity in the applica-
tion of copyright law by granting federal jurisdiction only to litigants
whose prayer for relief "arises under" copyright on the face of the com-
plaint. By ensuring that federal courts are the exclusive forum for genu-
inely pled copyright cases, the rule increases consistency. 45  The rule
allows parties to consistently determine where their case will be heard;
allowing the federal courts to have a monopoly on copyright law helps to
maintain a desirable level of doctrinal stability. 46  The well pleaded
complaint rule directs only appropriate copyright cases to the federal
courts in the spirit of true federal "arising under" jurisdiction.
Uniformity in the application of federal law increases the likelihood
that similarly situated parties will receive equal treatment. The Su-
preme Court has repeatedly recognized that this consistency is desir-
able. 148 Equal treatment is an ideal for which all levels of American jus-
tice strive. It is a fundamental tenet of the legal system that "like cases
should be treated alike.', 149 Universal adoption of the well pleaded com-
plaint rule makes it more likely that copyright litigants can expect reli-
able jurisdictional results anywhere in the federal court system.
144. Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 831-32.
145. Christopher A. Cotropia, Counterclaims, the Well Pleaded Complaint, and Federal Juris-
diction, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 38 (2004).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the
Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 597, 615 (1987)).
149. Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit "Choice of Law ": Erie Through the Looking Glass, 81
IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1207 (1996).
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Another benefit of uniformity in federal question jurisdiction is that
it puts copyright disputes in the hands of judges with expertise in the
area."5 Funneling copyright cases to the federal courts benefits all par-
ties because federal judges are better equipped to adjudicate disputes
involving questions of federal copyright law. Application of the well
pleaded complaint rule ensures that federal copyright cases are only
heard by federal judges. Litigants will be better served by federal judges
applying federal law when deciding federal copyright cases.
Uniformity in determining copyright jurisdiction will also discour-
age parties from forum shopping. If the fair resolution of a claim hinges
upon whether a court favors the well pleaded complaint rule or the es-
sence test, forum shopping will result. Different circuits applying differ-
ent standards for resolving copyright jurisdiction allows litigants to ma-
nipulate the administration of justice. 15' There are inherent inequities in
a system where a plaintiff can expect to find federal jurisdiction for his
claim in one circuit while being relegated to state court in another circuit.
This could lead to venue bias, disharmony, and unequal treatment.
The Image decision increases uniformity by bringing the Tenth Cir-
cuit into line with other circuits that have adopted the well pleaded com-
plaint rule for determining "arising under" copyright jurisdiction.15 2 The
image court noted that it had previously endorsed the well pleaded com-
plaint standard in Ausherman v. Stump.'53 In that 1981 decision, the
Tenth Circuit found that a patent infringement action brought under a
contract claim did not garner federal jurisdiction. 154 The Ausherman case
arose during a period of Second Circuit indecision-after T.B. Harms,
prior to Schoenberg, and long before Bassett. Although the Tenth Cir-
cuit had previously adopted the well pleaded complaint rule in Ausher-
man, 55 it cited growing support for the rule when explicitly adopting it
in image.'56 By highlighting other circuits' consistent embrace of the
well pleaded complaint rule, the Tenth Circuit took a noteworthy and
admirable step in pursuit of uniformity.
The Tenth Circuit's acknowledgment of other circuits' adoption of
the well pleaded complaint rule highlights the importance of having a
universal standard for "arising under" federal jurisdiction. The Second
Circuit has long been a source of federal circuit precedent in copyright
150. Cotropia, supra note 145, at 38.
151. See Schaffner, supra note 149, at 1193 (citing Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1677 (1990)).
152. Image Software, Inc. v. Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1051 n.10 (10th Cir.
2006) (citing Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 350-51 (2d Cir. 2000)) (noting
that the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had adopted the Second Circuit's ap-
proach).
153. 643 F.2d 715, 718 (10th Cir. 1981).
154. Ausherman, 643 F.2d at 718.
155. Id.
156. Image, 459 F.3d at 1049.
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law 157 and it is not surprising that other circuits have followed its lead.
The judicial system is stronger when it operates with uniformity regard-
ing a particular issue.
B. Inadequacies of the Essence Test
Adoption of the well pleaded complaint rule is especially appropri-
ate in light of the inadequacies of the essence test. The essence test re-
quires the court to consider the complaint and all the surrounding cir-
cumstances to resolve the jurisdictional question.158 This forces the court
to determine jurisdiction before it can assess the "essence" of the case.
This is impractical and may undermine a claimant's legitimate choice of
jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is normally determined at the outset of a case, long be-
fore formal argument of the issues before the court. Yet the essence test
seeks to determine jurisdiction based on a full understanding of the is-
sues and each party's respective arguments. There is an inherent contra-
diction in achieving a jurisdictional determination early in the case based
on inquiry into issues that cannot be understood at such an early stage.
159
Even if a court adequately determines the "essence" of a case at the
outset, the essence test can deprive a plaintiff with legitimate copyright
claims of a venue to pursue relief.1 60 Under the essence test, a plaintiff
bringing suit for relief under the Copyright Act can be denied access to
the federal courts if the district court determines that the copyright claims
are incidental to a contract dispute. 6  The injustice of such a denial is
that this plaintiff is left to plead his case in state court and is denied the
benefit of copyright remedies.
C. Addressing Arguments Against the Well Pleaded Complaint Rule
The Second Circuit's long period of indecision on the standard for
determining when suits "arise under" the Copyright Act testifies to the
volatility of the issue. Although many circuits have adopted the well
pleaded complaint rule, 62 there are still arguments against its implemen-
tation. Addressing three of these grievances illuminates a justified pref-
erence for the well pleaded complaint rule and an opportunity to improve
its application.
Policy implications fuel some of the arguments against the well
pleaded complaint rule. 163 One criticism is that failing to consider fed-
157. See Mark R. Kravitz, Developments in the Second Circuit: 1997-1998, 18 QUINNIPIAC L.
REv. 809, 848-49 (1999).
158. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 180.
159. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 354.
160. Id. at 352.
161. Id. at 352-53.
162. Image, 459 F.3d at 1051 n.10.
163. Cotropia, supra note 145, at 37.
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eral law counterclaims as a basis for jurisdiction may frustrate the inter-
ests of the counterclaiming party. Yet allowing a counterclaim to estab-
lish federal jurisdiction inherently frustrates a plaintiff pursuing state
court jurisdiction. In either circumstance, one party's jurisdictional pref-
erence will be thwarted.
Consider a plaintiff pursuing a state breach of contract claim and a
defendant with a federal copyright counterclaim. In the absence of the
well pleaded complaint rule the counterclaimant may remove the case to
federal court over the objections of the plaintiff who originally filed the
case in state court. Abiding by the mantra that the plaintiff is master of
his complaint, 164 the well pleaded complaint rule rightly supports the
plaintiffs interest in maintaining jurisdiction in the forum in which he
brought his complaint. Although application of the rule may fail to sat-
isfy the counterclaiming defendant, the plaintiff is master of his com-
plaint and deserves to have his state claim adjudicated.
In Bassett, the Second Circuit addressed another criticism of the
well pleaded complaint rule: by allowing any plaintiff to gain federal
jurisdiction by raising a federal copyright claim, the federal courts will
be flooded by cases that are truly contract disputes.165 The court dis-
missed this potentiality with historical fact. 16 6 During the twenty-eight
years between TB. Harms and Schoenberg, there was no evidence of the
well pleaded complaint rule resulting in an overwhelming increase of
Second Circuit copyright suits where the only disputes were over con-
tract or ownership. 167 This information refutes the fear that the well
pleaded complaint rule will result in an unmanageable increase of ques-
tionable copyright cases. The Bassett court maintained that the well
pleaded complaint rule should be the standard by which all federal cir-
cuits determine copyright jurisdiction. 168
Another grievance with the well pleaded complaint rule is that it
will frustrate the legitimate interests of the parties.' 69 This argument
maintains that a plaintiff can use the well pleaded complaint rule to trap a
federal copyright counterclaim in state court.170 This plaintiff could file a
potentially federal case in state court to prevent a defendant from plead-
ing in federal court. 71 This is a genuinely unfortunate possibility. A
defendant with a valid federal counterclaim could be denied a federal
forum and federal copyright remedies.
164. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. at 25.
165. Bassett, 204 F.3d at 351.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 352-53.
169. Cotropia, supra note 145, at 37.
170. Id. at 47.
171. Id.
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Yet failing to implement the well pleaded complaint rule could have
similarly unjust ramifications. A plaintiff filing a state law claim in state
court could be frustrated by a defendant whose federal counterclaim re-
moves the case to federal court. This potentiality is equally unfortunate.
The well pleaded complaint rule allows for the possibility that an un-
scrupulous party could game the system for an unfair advantage. This
possibility is a regrettable consequence of many bright-line rules. How-
ever, the tradition, uniformity, and predictability of the well pleaded
complaint rule make it the better option. An exception to the well
pleaded complaint rule offers relief in those cases where a state court
claim legitimately deserves federal jurisdiction.
D. The Complete Preemption Exception to the Well Pleaded Complaint
Rule
While the well pleaded complaint rule is the best path for determin-
ing jurisdiction in contract and copyright cases, there are circumstances
that may unjustly prevent a party from appearing in federal court.172 The
doctrine of complete preemption addresses many of these circumstances
and should function as a valuable doctrinal tool in resolving jurisdic-
tional disputes in the copyright context. The combination of the well
pleaded complaint rule and the complete preemption doctrine offers a
solution to determining "arising under" jurisdiction for copyright.
The preemption doctrine embodies the basic notion that a federal
law can supersede or supplant a state law or regulation when the two
conflict. 173 Preemption generally applies to matters that are so signifi-
cantly national in character that the federal law preempts the state law.
174
Complete preemption is a relatively new doctrine that has been held to
operate when a federal statute's preemptive force is so overwhelming
that it converts an ordinary state law complaint into a federal complaint
for the purposes of the well pleaded complaint rule.
75
Complete preemption applies when federal statutory language dem-
onstrates clear congressional intent that claims not only be preempted by
federal law but also that they be removable.' 76 As noted above, the fed-
eral Copyright Act grants exclusive federal jurisdiction for all copyright-
related issues. 177 Congress directed that the universe of copyright be
172. As noted above, under the well pleaded complaint rule a legitimate copyright case may be
stuck in state court because of the way the complaint is drafted by the plaintiff.
173. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (8th ed. 2004).
174. Amy J. Everhart, Ritchie v. Williams and the Complete Preemption Doctrine in Copy-
right: The New Federal/State Debate, 42 TENN. BAR JOURNAL 18, 18 (2006).
175. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 303 (8th ed. 2004).
176. Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 553 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67 (1987)).
177. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (West 2007). Specifically, § 301(a) identifies all rights within
the general scope of copyright as exclusively federal. Id.
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restricted to the federal arena. 178 This provides the basis for applying
complete preemption to copyright.
Courts have applied the complete preemption doctrine in copyright
cases by removing cases to federal court that would otherwise, under the
well pleaded complaint rule, remain in state court.17 9 In Ritchie v. Wil-
liams, 18 musical artist Robert Ritchie (aka Kid Rock) filed a federal
trademark infringement action against promoter Alvin Williams. 181 Less
than two months later, Ritchie's former record company (for which Wil-
liams served as Vice President) brought.suit in Michigan State Court
alleging various state law claims. 82 The state action included claims for
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, misrepresentation, conversion and
injunctive relief.183 Williams claimed that he and Ritchie entered into a
contract which granted Williams publication, performance, and distribu-
tion rights to songs written by Ritchie. 184 Ritchie subsequently cancelled
the agreement, going on to fame and fortune.
185
Ritchie sought to remove the state action to federal court and the
federal court held that Williams' claims were "clearly based in copy-
right."'186 Many of the state court claims were covered by § 106 of the
Copyright Act: the rights to reproduce, distribute and perform the copy-
righted work.187 The well pleaded complaint rule would have mandated
state court jurisdiction for these claims because Williams' original claims
prayed for state court remedies for violations of state laws. The federal
court used the complete preemption doctrine to recharacterize the state
court claims as copyright claims and grant federal jurisdiction. 
188
As exemplified in Ritchie v. Williams, the complete preemption
doctrine is a practical exception to the well pleaded complaint rule.189 It
is especially applicable in copyright law where rights are assigned and
licensed in contracts. While the cause of action may be a state claim for
breach of contract, misrepresentation, or unjust enrichment, complete
preemption allows a court to examine the complaint and determine
whether it implicates significant federal interests.
178. Id.
179. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 285; Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 301
(2d Cir. 2004); Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates, Inc., I F.3d 225, 227 (4th Cir. 1993).
180. 395 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2005).
181. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
182. Id. at 287 n.2.
183. Order Granting Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Deny-
ing Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Ritchie v. Williams, No.
01-71712 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Order Granting Summary Judgment].
184. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
185. Id.
186. Order Granting Summary Judgment, supra note 183, at 19.
187. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (West 2007).
188. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
189. Everhart, supra note 174, at 20.
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Ritchie v. Williams is an example of a case where copyright claims
were masked in state court causes of action perhaps to avoid federal ju-
risdiction. Williams claimed that Ritchie granted Williams the rights to
Ritchie's music in an agreement that was to expire in 1993.190 Williams
brought his state court claims in 2001 but the statute of limitations on a
copyright claim is only three years and therefore would have expired in
1996. Williams may have brought his claims in state court because his
federal claims would have been barred under to the statute of limitations.
Under the well pleaded complaint rule, this case would have been
stuck in state court because the face of the complaint did not pray for
relief under the Copyright Act (or any other federal law). As proponents
of the essence test would note, this application of the well pleaded com-
plaint rule would have prevented Ritchie from having his legitimate
copyright issues resolved in federal court. The complete preemption
doctrine solves this shortcoming of the well pleaded complaint rule by
allowing removal to federal court.
There are two requirements that must be satisfied for a state court
claim to be preempted under the Copyright Act: (1) the work must fall
within the scope of copyright; and (2) the state law rights must be
equivalent to rights granted federal copyright protection.' 9' In Ritchie,
the disputed works were musical works which garner copyright protec-
tion under § 102(a)(2) of the Copyright Act.1 92 Williams' state claims
alleged that Ritchie was unjustly enriched by these works and that
Ritchie breached his contract assigning Williams the rights to these
works.193 Federal copyright law protects these same rights that Ritchie
was accused of infringing.1 94 In this example, complete preemption
justly removed Ritchie from state to federal court.
The complete preemption exception to the well pleaded complaint
rule solves a problem in classifying "arising under" jurisdiction for copy-
right claims. While the well pleaded complaint rule is generally superior
in determining copyright jurisdiction, its vulnerability is the risk that a
valid copyright claim could be characterized in state law terms to avoid
federal jurisdiction. Application of the complete preemption doctrine
addresses this shortcoming by providing an avenue for state claims to be
heard in federal court without depriving plaintiffs and the courts of the
benefits of the well pleaded complaint rule. Courts should employ the
well pleaded complaint rule in conjunction with the complete preemption
doctrine to keep copyright claims out of state court and ensure that par-
ties with valid copyright claims will be heard in federal court.
190. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
191. Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 300 (6th Cir. 2004).
192. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a)(2) (West 2007) ("Copyright protection subsists, in . . . musical
works.").
193. Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 287.
194. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106.
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CONCLUSION
The importance of federal uniformity cannot be overstated. Until
the Supreme Court decides an issue, the circuit courts of appeals are en-
trusted with determining the best path in a disputed area of law. The
Tenth Circuit should be commended for taking the opportunity to adopt
the well pleaded complaint rule and promoting consistency in federal
"arising under" copyright jurisdiction. While all circuits have not em-
braced the test, Image places the Tenth Circuit in the clear majority.
195
The well pleaded complaint rule has limitations that require atten-
tion. It fails to ensure that all legitimate copyright claims arrive in fed-
eral court. Yet the primary alternative (the essence test) is a worse op-
tion. Arguments against the well pleaded complaint rule leave courts
without a standard that allows for equal treatment of all parties. The
equitable determination of federal or state jurisdiction "poses among the
knottiest procedural problems in copyright jurisprudence. 196 The pre-
sent lack of alternatives suggests the need for a fresh proposal.
Both the well pleaded complaint rule and the complete preemption
doctrine are established principles of modern jurisprudence. A signifi-
cant shortcoming of the well pleaded complaint rule is the possibility that
a defendant with legitimate copyright claims will be denied federal juris-
diction by a plaintiff pleading breach of contract claims in state court.
Application of complete preemption addresses this shortcoming and acts
as a valuable exception to the well pleaded complaint rule. Implementa-
tion of this amendment to the rule should be applied across the federal
circuits to provide uniform jurisdictional determinations
The Tenth Circuit is right to adopt the well pleaded complaint rule
for copyright and the Second Circuit has put a concerted effort into es-
tablishing a bright line rule. As the ongoing development of technology
continues to make demands upon copyright law, the jurisprudence must
adapt and craft rules that meet the demands of the system.
David Ratner*
195. The image court referenced Bassett's assertion that the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits have all adopted the Second Circuit's angle on this jurisdictional determination.
Image, 459 F.3d at 1051 n.9 (citing Bassett, 204 F.3d at 350-51). Other cases adopting the well
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